第 02 章

卢比奥手握和平筹码却选择不用 雅思精读

精读《卫报》评论对卢比奥外交的批评,学习政治评论的论证结构、贬义表达与长难句,并迁移到雅思写作与口语。

首发于 2026.08.16
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    英文原文

    来源:Marco Rubio has unique power to promote peace, but he hasn't. He is almost as bad for the world as Trump;The Guardian,Simon Tisdall,2026 年 8 月 16 日。

    [1] As chief US diplomat, Rubio could do great good. His pandering and neglect are a disgrace we shouldn't ignore

    [2] Viewed from the state department in Washington DC, the world is on fire – but record heatwaves are not to blame. The unresolved Iran war has badly burned Donald Trump. His military campaign conclusively failed, energy and food prices are still rising, and a Republican rout in November's midterm elections looms. Humiliatingly, Israel this week flatly rejected his latest Gaza peace proposals, days after Trump congratulated himself on a "historic breakthrough". In Europe, Russia's attacks on Nato allies grow increasingly brazen, threatening a wider escalation. The Ukraine war, which Trump vowed to end, is now well into its fifth year, with civilians on both sides caught in the killing fields. And these are just the bigger firestorms. There are plenty more.

    [3] Rarely has the need for effective, professional diplomacy been more pressing. So step forward Marco Rubio, US secretary of state and chief American diplomat. These are challenges that, if successfully tackled, could propel the 55-year-old son of Cuban immigrants and the former US senator for Florida into pole position in the 2028 Republican presidential nomination race. Here is a chance for Rubio to defy critics who dismiss him as a lickspittle and Trump dogsbody, and transform himself into respected global statesman. His boss mocked him as "little Marco" and a "loser" when they were election rivals in 2016. (Rubio called him a conman.) Now is Rubio's opportunity to go big, be brave and prove he's a winner.

    [4] Or maybe not.

    [5] Rubio is unlike recent US secretaries of state – heavyweights such as Hillary Clinton and Antony Blinken, or John Kerry, famed for his high-energy shuttle diplomacy. Rubio has little time for "peace processes". Instead, he projects brute US power to impose take-it-or-leave-it "solutions" that advance US interests, as defined by Trump. It's a modern form of imperialism. Target countries have a choice: become client states, like Venezuela and, prospectively, Cuba and Greenland, or be crushed. In Iran, the policy is not regime change, let alone democratic renewal. It's regime compliance. Rubio behaves less like a peace-broker, more like a pith-helmeted colonial viceroy demanding fealty from obsequious satraps.

    [6] Speaking in Munich in February, Rubio aired his hawkishly retro doctrine of US primacy. He lamented the decline of "the great western empires … accelerated by godless communist revolutions and anti-colonial uprisings" and warned Europe faced "civilisational erasure". The US didn't want milksop allies "shackled by guilt and shame" about their imperial past, he said. "We want allies who are proud of their culture and heritage … and who, together with us, are willing and able to defend it." Here was a familiar assertion of US hegemony, but one stripped of bogus altruism and pretence. It sounded a death knell for diplomacy. Trump has attacked eight countries in the past year. Cuba, Rubio's obsession, could be next.

    [7] Rubio's reluctance to get personally involved in peacemaking may be partly explained by his other, contradictory role, as Trump's national security adviser. He has accepted the White House's outsourcing of negotiations over Ukraine and Palestine to amateur envoys of limited ability – namely Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and business crony Steve Witkoff. Broadly speaking, Rubio has steered clear of direct involvement in the Iran talks, too, leaving JD Vance, the vice-president and his main potential rival in 2028, to take the flak. Rubio's arm's length approach smacks of calculation. Or maybe he's just out of his depth. Maybe he has no clear idea what he, Marco, really thinks about any of these issues and simply does Trump's erratic bidding.

    [8] This perception of a political chameleon lacking firm principles, consistent opinions and a strong moral compass is reinforced by his record. His biographer, Manuel Roig-Franzia, believes Rubio's personal and political slipperiness – he once became a Mormon, then reverted to Catholicism – is rooted in a childhood need to belong, to be on the winning side, no matter the price. Senator Rubio was a China hawk. Now he toes Trump's ingratiating line on Beijing. He used to castigate Russia; now he's an appeaser. He championed overseas assistance but, in office, has gutted USAID and seeks to dismantle the international criminal court, a keystone of global order. He blasted Barack Obama's Iran nuclear deal. Now he backs an accord that would offer additional concessions to Tehran. Accused by the Vatican of waging an immoral, unjust war, he travelled to Rome and set the pope straight.

    [9] The irony, or tragedy, of the Rubio conundrum is he has the power to do great good, if only he would stand up and be counted. Russia's Vladimir Putin, losing on the battlefield and at home, is weaker than at any time since 2022. Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelenskyy is short of missile interceptors, soldiers and political support. A ceasefire deal freezing the conflict is there for the making by the only country – the US – that can meaningfully squeeze both sides. Likewise, in Israel, the architect of the Gaza genocide and disastrous wars with Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah – Benjamin Netanyahu – faces defeat in October's elections. Here's a rare opportunity to quietly shelve Trump's Board of Peace idiocies, halt Jewish settler violence in the West Bank and make a fresh, inclusive start based on UN resolutions.

    [10] Rubio could also do the Middle East, the global economy, American consumers and himself a power of good by taking charge of moribund peace talks with Iran and resuscitating the June memorandum of understanding that Tehran insists is the only route out of the strait of Hormuz logjam. In doing so, Rubio would have the enthusiastic backing of most Americans, European and Gulf state governments, energy producers and businesses, and Maga supporters who rightly fear Trump has dragged the US into another forever war. Even Trump may be grateful. He knows he's in a hole. He needs someone to dig him out.

    [11] The fact that Rubio, despite his ostensibly uniquely powerful position, is unlikely to do any of the above marks him out as the most dangerous man in the US administration after Trump himself. He is dangerous because he enables and facilitates Trump's worst instincts – and neglects his duty. He is dangerous because he provides pseudo-intellectual respectability to far-right fantasies about unfettered US supremacy. More so than the impetuous Vance, indulging in puerile name-calling on social media, and the "secretary of war" Pete Hegseth, a ranting ultra-nationalist, Rubio is dangerous because he can look and sound reasonable. He stands a fair chance of becoming Trump's chosen successor and heir to the Maga brand.

    [12] Maybe, before that happens, he will change again. Maybe he will rediscover a few principles, find a diplomatic backbone, extinguish a few fires. He has shown repeatedly that his views are infinitely fungible. Rubio could yet do great things. Or he could become a problem as great or greater than Trump.

    文章脉络

    这是一篇观点评论:作者先铺陈美国同时面对的多场危机,再指出国务卿卢比奥本应从中斡旋,却选择以实力施压代替谈判,最后论证他的危险性——不在于激进,而在于「看起来讲道理」。

    段号范围作用一句话要点事实 / 评论
    [1]–[3]引入世界多线告急,卢比奥握有成为政治家的机会事实 + 评论(作者判断机会存在)
    [4]–[5]转折或反证但卢比奥不谈判,只强加「要么接受要么被压垮」的方案评论(作者对政策的定性)
    [6]展开慕尼黑讲话显示「美国至上」的旧式霸权论,等同外交丧钟事实 + 评论
    [7]–[8]展开他把谈判外包给非专业特使;履历显示立场反复事实 + 评论(传记作者认为源自童年)
    [9]–[10]展开俄乌、以巴、伊朗都存在可谈的窗口,他有条件却没行动评论(作者认为窗口存在)
    [11]–[12]收束他危险在于「听上去合理」,且可能成为接班人评论

    阅读提醒:这是评论而非报道。文中「世界着火」「丧钟」「殖民总督」都是作者的比喻,不是对事件的中性描述;引用其判断时要写成「作者认为」,不能当作事实转述。文中的引语也只代表说话者立场,包括特朗普自夸的「历史性突破」。

    地道表达

    共 12 条,均可在英文原文中字面检索到;例句为原创,附中文释义。

    表达原文语境含义与搭配限制语域原创例句
    be on fire[2] "the world is on fire – but record heatwaves are not to blame"比喻局势全面告急;口语与评论常用,正式报告改用 in crisis仅新闻评论正式写作改用 in crisis:The region is in crisis on several fronts. 该地区在多条战线上陷入危机。
    loom[2] "a Republican rout in November's midterm elections looms"(坏事)逼近;主语多为危机、失败、选举写作A funding gap looms for the project. 该项目面临资金缺口。
    flatly reject[2] "Israel this week flatly rejected his latest Gaza peace proposals"断然拒绝;flatly 表示不留余地写作The union flatly rejected the offer. 工会断然拒绝了这一提议。
    grow increasingly brazen[2] "Russia's attacks on Nato allies grow increasingly brazen"越来越肆无忌惮;brazen 含贬义写作Scams targeting the elderly have grown increasingly brazen. 针对老年人的骗局越来越肆无忌惮。
    step forward[3] "So step forward Marco Rubio"字面「上前一步」,此处是反讽式点名登场仅新闻评论正式写作改用 turn to:This is where local governments must act. 这正是地方政府必须行动之处。
    take-it-or-leave-it[5] "impose take-it-or-leave-it 'solutions'"不容讨价还价;复合形容词放在名词前写作The offer was take-it-or-leave-it. 这个提议没有商量余地。
    sound a death knell[6] "It sounded a death knell for diplomacy."敲响丧钟,喻宣告终结仅新闻评论写作改用 mark the end of:The ruling may mark the end of the practice. 该裁决可能标志这一做法终结。
    smack of[7] "Rubio's arm's length approach smacks of calculation"带有某种意味,多指负面;后接名词写作The decision smacks of panic. 这个决定透出慌乱。
    out of his depth[7] "Or maybe he's just out of his depth"力不能及;来自深水比喻口语Without training, new staff often feel out of their depth. 没有培训,新员工常感力不从心。
    toe the line[8] "Now he toes Trump's ingratiating line on Beijing"顺从既定立场;toe 不要与 tow 混用仅新闻评论写作改用 comply with:The agency complied with the new rules. 该机构遵守了新规定。
    stand up and be counted[9] "if only he would stand up and be counted"公开表态并承担责任写作Voters expect leaders to stand up and be counted on such issues. 选民期待领导人在此类问题上明确表态。
    dig someone out[10] "He needs someone to dig him out."把人从困境中拉出来;口语化口语The team dug itself out of a two-goal deficit. 球队扳回两球劣势。

    长难句拆解

    插入条件从句割裂主谓

    原句:[3] These are challenges that, if successfully tackled, could propel the 55-year-old son of Cuban immigrants and the former US senator for Florida into pole position in the 2028 Republican presidential nomination race.

    主干:主句 These are challenges,后接关系从句 that ... could propel ... into pole position;propel A into B 是「把 A 推向 B」。

    层次与易错点:关系从句的主语是 that(即 challenges),谓语 could propel 被插入的条件从句 if successfully tackled 隔开;propel 的宾语是一个很长的名词短语,核心词是 son 与 senator,由 and 并列。易错点:看到 that, if... 时容易把 if 从句当成主句的条件,从而找不到 could propel 的主语;successfully tackled 是省略了 they are 的被动形式,不是主动。

    逻辑关系:条件 + 结果——如果处理得当,这些挑战会变成机会。

    参考译文:这些挑战若能妥善应对,足以把他——这位 55 岁的古巴移民之子、佛罗里达州前参议员——推向 2028 年共和党总统提名的领先位置。

    写作迁移:These reforms, if properly funded, could move the country closer to energy independence. 这些改革若资金到位,能让该国更接近能源独立。

    超长主语与被动谓语

    原句:[8] This perception of a political chameleon lacking firm principles, consistent opinions and a strong moral compass is reinforced by his record.

    主干:主语 This perception,谓语 is reinforced by his record;中间一大串都是 perception 的后置修饰。

    层次与易错点:of a political chameleon 说明是什么样的印象,lacking firm principles, consistent opinions and a strong moral compass 是现在分词短语修饰 chameleon,三个并列宾语共用 lacking。易错点:主语与谓语相隔 15 词,读到 lacking 时容易误以为它是谓语;而真正的谓语是被动语态,逻辑是「他的履历加强了这种印象」。

    逻辑关系:因果(履历 → 印象被强化),被动句把结果放在句首。

    参考译文:这种认为他是缺乏坚定原则、一致主张和明确道德立场的政治变色龙的印象,因他的过往履历而更加牢固。

    写作迁移:This view of the city as a place without a clear identity is reinforced by its scattered planning. 这种认为该市缺乏清晰定位的看法,因其零散的规划而更加牢固。

    省略 that 的表语从句

    原句:[9] The irony, or tragedy, of the Rubio conundrum is he has the power to do great good, if only he would stand up and be counted.

    主干:主句 The irony, or tragedy, of the Rubio conundrum is ...,is 后接表语从句 he has the power to do great good,that 被省略。

    层次与易错点:or tragedy 是插入的同位成分,不影响结构;if only 引导虚拟语气,表示与事实相反的愿望。易错点:省略 that 后,is he has 这样的连续结构会让人误读为倒装疑问句;if only he would 不能理解为「只要他愿意就能」,它带有「可惜他没有」的遗憾语气。

    逻辑关系:转折 + 虚拟愿望——讽刺之处在于他有能力,却没有做。

    参考译文:卢比奥这一困局的讽刺之处(或者说悲剧之处)在于:他本有能力做成了不起的事——只要他肯公开站出来、承担自己的立场。

    写作迁移:The tragedy of the scheme is it could have worked, if only the funding had arrived on time. 该方案的悲剧在于它本可以奏效,只要资金按时到位。

    The fact that 主语与 despite 插入语叠加

    原句:[11] The fact that Rubio, despite his ostensibly uniquely powerful position, is unlikely to do any of the above marks him out as the most dangerous man in the US administration after Trump himself.

    主干:主语是 The fact that ...(同位语从句作主语),谓语 marks him out as ...。

    层次与易错点:同位语从句里,Rubio 与 is unlikely 之间插入了 despite his ostensibly uniquely powerful position;ostensibly 是「表面上」,暗示作者不认可这个「强大」;marks him out as 意为「使他显得是」。易错点:把 despite 短语当主句状语会丢掉「按理说权力很大」与「实际上不做」的对照;把 ostensibly 漏译会让句子变成纯褒义。

    逻辑关系:让步(尽管职位显赫)+ 因果(正因如此才显出危险)。

    参考译文:卢比奥尽管表面上拥有独一无二的强大职位,却不太可能做上述任何一件事——这一事实使他成为美国政府中除特朗普本人之外最危险的人物。

    写作迁移:The fact that the mayor, despite broad public support, has avoided the issue marks her out as a cautious politician. 市长尽管广受支持却回避这一问题,这一事实使她显得是一个谨慎的政治人物。

    术语与行业黑话

    • secretary of state|本文含义:美国国务卿,即首席外交官|使用背景:美国内阁首位部长,主管国务院与对外事务|近词辨析:与 foreign secretary(英国外交大臣)职能相近但国情不同;不等于 national security adviser(总统的国安顾问)|可否迁移到雅思:可(政治类话题可作具体例证)。
    • regime change|本文含义:推翻他国政权|使用背景:冷战以来美国外交常用说法,本文对比「regime compliance」|近词辨析:regime change 是换政权,regime compliance 是逼现政权听话,本文认为美国在伊朗采取的是后者|可否迁移到雅思:可(国际关系话题)。
    • client state|本文含义:依附于大国的附庸国|使用背景:冷战术语,指外交与安全上受大国支配的国家|近词辨析:client state 有依附关系,ally 是平等盟友|可否迁移到雅思:可(需说明语境)。
    • hegemony|本文含义:霸权,指一国在区域或全球的主导地位|使用背景:国际关系核心概念,常与「美国霸权」讨论绑定|近词辨析:hegemony 是结构性主导,dominance 更宽泛|可否迁移到雅思:可。
    • shuttle diplomacy|本文含义:穿梭外交,调解人往返各方之间斡旋|使用背景:1970 年代基辛格中东斡旋后被广泛使用|近词辨析:与 mediation 相近,但强调来回奔走的物理动作|可否迁移到雅思:可(写作中作具体细节)。
    • forever war|本文含义:看不到尽头的战争|使用背景:2001 年后指美国在中东的长期军事行动|近词辨析:不等于 total war(全面战争),forever war 强调时间无终点|可否迁移到雅思:可(战争类话题)。
    • Maga|本文含义:特朗普「让美国再次伟大」的运动及其支持者|使用背景:Make America Great Again 的缩写,2016 年起成为政治身份标签|近词辨析:Maga 指运动与人群,Republican 指政党,两者重叠但不相等|可否迁移到雅思:不可,除非先交代背景。

    背景补充

    • 事实:文中提到以色列拒绝美国主导的「15 点加沙和平方案」([2]),特朗普此前刚宣称取得「历史性突破」。这是评论的论据之一,用于说明美方调解受挫。
    • 事实:卢比奥 2026 年 2 月在慕尼黑安全会议发言,谈「西方帝国的衰落」并批评欧洲面临「文明抹除」([6])。该讲话是作者判断其外交观的核心证据。
    • 观点(Manuel Roig-Franzia):这位传记作者认为,卢比奥立场反复源于童年「需要归属、要站在赢的一方」的心理([8])。这是他人判断,不是已证实的事实。
    • 观点(Simon Tisdall):作者认为卢比奥的危险不在于激进,而在于「看上去、听上去都讲道理」,因此更容易获得信任([11])。

    雅思迁移

    写作

    题目:Some people believe a country should put its own interests above international cooperation. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

    提纲:

    • 立场:不完全同意——国家利益是出发点,但长远的国家利益往往依赖合作。
    • 主体一:单边施压能短期见效,代价是盟友信任流失。
    • 主体二:气候、能源、安全等问题无法由一国单独解决,合作本身就是利益。
    • 结论:应把合作视为实现国家利益的手段,而不是与利益对立的选择。

    示范段(74 词):

    Putting national interests first is not inherently unreasonable, since governments answer to their own citizens. However, the argument treats cooperation as a cost rather than a strategy. When a state imposes terms on partners instead of negotiating, it may win a short-term concession while losing the trust that future deals depend on. On issues such as climate and energy, cooperation is not an alternative to national interest; it is how that interest is achieved.

    阅读

    1. 作者认为卢比奥本可以借哪些机会确立政治地位? 定位:[3]、[9]–[10] 依据:"propel ... into pole position in the 2028 Republican presidential nomination race" 答案:处理伊朗、乌克兰与加沙的谈判,促成停火与新方案,从而以和平斡旋者的形象冲击 2028 年提名。

    2. 作者如何概括卢比奥的外交方式? 定位:[5] 依据:"he projects brute US power to impose take-it-or-leave-it 'solutions'" 答案:以实力施压,逼迫对方接受不容谈判的方案,作者称之为「现代形式的帝国主义」,目标是「政权顺从」而非更迭。

    3. 为什么作者说他危险? 定位:[11] 依据:"Rubio is dangerous because he can look and sound reasonable" 答案:他不像其他官员那样激进外露,而是「看上去讲道理」,因此更容易为极端主张提供体面的包装。

    4. 作者用慕尼黑讲话说明了什么? 定位:[6] 依据:"It sounded a death knell for diplomacy" 答案:说明其外交观是旧式的美国至上主义,否定谈判本身,作者据此判断专业外交空间被压缩。

    5. 结尾对卢比奥的前景给出了确定判断吗? 定位:[12] 依据:"Maybe, before that happens, he will change again" 答案:没有。结尾用两个 maybe 并列可能性:他可能改变,也可能成为比肩甚至超过特朗普的问题。

    口语延伸

    Part 2

    Describe a news story about politics that you found interesting. You should say:

    • what the story was about
    • where you read it
    • what interested you about it and explain why you think it matters.

    2 分钟提纲(55 词):I read a Guardian column about a US secretary of state who had the chance to broker peace but chose pressure instead. What interested me was how the writer argued — not by insulting him, but by showing his contradictions. It matters because it shows how diplomatic language can hide hard power.

    Part 3

    1. Why do some politicians avoid taking a clear position?(出处:[7]) 思路:从选举风险与责任归属两点答。 Taking a clear position means owning the outcome, and that is risky before an election. Staying vague lets them keep both options open while others absorb the criticism.

    2. Is it fair for newspapers to publish strong opinions about politicians?(出处:[1]) 思路:区分事实报道与评论,强调署名与可反驳性。 It can be fair, as long as the piece is clearly labelled as comment and the writer puts their name to it. Readers can then judge the argument instead of mistaking it for reporting.

    3. How can ordinary readers tell opinion from fact in the news?(出处:[2]) 思路:看版面归类、看形容词与比喻、查原始来源。 A reliable habit is to check whether the article attributes claims to a named source. Loaded metaphors and adjectives are another signal that you are reading a view rather than a record.

    [1] 作为美国首席外交官,卢比奥本可以大有作为。他的逢迎与失职是一种我们不该忽视的耻辱。

    [2] 从华盛顿的美国国务院望去,世界正在燃烧——但这不能怪创纪录的热浪。悬而未决的伊朗战争让唐纳德·特朗普付出了惨重代价。他的军事行动彻底失败,能源与食品价格仍在上涨,11 月中期选举中共和党惨败的阴影正在逼近。更丢脸的是,就在特朗普刚刚自夸取得「历史性突破」几天后,以色列本周断然拒绝了他最新的加沙和平方案。在欧洲,俄罗斯对北约盟国的攻击越来越肆无忌惮,威胁着更大规模的冲突升级。特朗普曾誓言要结束的乌克兰战争,如今已进入第五个年头,双方平民被困在这片杀戮之地。而这还只是较大的几场风暴,类似的还有不少。

    [3] 对有效、专业的外交的需求,很少像现在这样迫切。那么,请出场吧,美国国务卿、美国首席外交官马尔科·卢比奥。这些挑战若能妥善应对,足以把他——这位 55 岁的古巴移民之子、佛罗里达州前参议员——推向 2028 年共和党总统提名的领先位置。这是卢比奥反驳批评者的机会:那些人嘲讽他是马屁精、特朗普的走狗;这也是他把自己转变为受人尊敬的全球政治家的机会。2016 年两人还是竞选对手时,他的老板曾嘲弄他是「小马可」和「失败者」。(卢比奥当时称特朗普是骗子。)现在正是卢比奥大展身手、勇敢行事、证明自己是赢家的机会。

    [4] 又或者,未必如此。

    [5] 卢比奥不同于近几任美国国务卿——比如希拉里·克林顿、安东尼·布林肯这样的重量级人物,或是因高强度的穿梭外交而闻名的约翰·克里。卢比奥对「和平进程」没什么耐心。相反,他投射的是粗暴的美国实力,强加「要么接受、要么拉倒」式的「解决方案」,以推进由特朗普界定的美国利益。这是一种现代形式的帝国主义。目标国家只有两种选择:成为附庸国——如委内瑞拉,以及可能步其后尘的古巴和格陵兰——或者被碾碎。在伊朗,政策目标不是政权更迭,更不是民主复兴,而是政权顺从。卢比奥的行为不太像和平掮客,倒更像戴着遮阳帽的殖民地总督,要求那些谄媚的藩属国效忠。

    [6] 今年 2 月在慕尼黑发表演讲时,卢比奥公开了他那套鹰派而复古的「美国至上」学说。他哀叹「伟大的西方帝国……在无神论的共产主义革命和反殖民起义的加速下」走向衰落,并警告欧洲面临「文明被抹除」。他说,美国不想要那种因帝国过往而被「负罪感和羞耻感」束缚的软弱盟友。「我们想要的是以自身文化与传承为傲的盟友……并且愿意、也有能力与我们一起捍卫它。」这是一次熟悉的美国霸权宣示,只是撕掉了虚伪的利他主义与伪装。它为外交敲响了丧钟。过去一年里,特朗普攻击了八个国家。而卢比奥的执念——古巴——可能是下一个。

    [7] 卢比奥不愿亲自参与调解,部分原因可能在于他的另一个、相互矛盾的身份:特朗普的国家安全顾问。他接受了白宫把乌克兰与巴勒斯坦的谈判外包给能力有限的外行特使——即特朗普的女婿贾里德·库什纳和商界亲信史蒂夫·维特科夫。总体而言,卢比奥也回避直接参与伊朗谈判,让副总统、他在 2028 年的主要潜在对手 JD·万斯去承受炮火。卢比奥这种保持距离的做法透着一股算计。又或者,他只是力不能及。也许对于这些问题,他——马可——自己究竟怎么想,他并没有清楚的想法,只是在执行特朗普反复无常的指令。

    [8] 这种认为他是缺乏坚定原则、一致主张和明确道德立场的政治变色龙的印象,因他的过往履历而更加牢固。他的传记作者曼努埃尔·罗伊格-弗兰西亚认为,卢比奥在个人与政治上的游移不定——他曾改信摩门教,后来又回归天主教——根源在于童年时对归属感的渴求:不惜一切代价站在赢的一方。参议员卢比奥曾是主张对华强硬的鹰派;如今在北京问题上,他顺着特朗普讨好式的路线走。他曾严厉批评俄罗斯,如今成了绥靖者。他曾力挺海外援助,上任后却大幅削减了美国国际开发署,还试图拆解作为全球秩序基石的国际刑事法院。他曾猛烈抨击贝拉克·奥巴马的伊朗核协议,如今却支持一项会给德黑兰更多让步的协议。在被梵蒂冈指责发动不道德、不义之战后,他亲赴罗马,把教皇「纠正」了一番。

    [9] 卢比奥这一困局的讽刺之处(或者说悲剧之处)在于:他本有能力做成了不起的事——只要他肯公开站出来、承担自己的立场。俄罗斯的弗拉基米尔·普京在战场和国内都节节失利,如今比 2022 年以来任何时候都更虚弱。乌克兰的弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基则缺少导弹拦截弹、兵员和政治支持。一份冻结冲突的停火协议,正等着唯一有能力真正挤压双方的美国来促成。同样,在以色列,加沙种族灭绝以及同哈马斯、伊朗、真主党灾难性战争的始作俑者本雅明·内塔尼亚胡,正面临 10 月选举的失败。这是一个难得的机会:悄悄搁置特朗普那套「和平委员会」的荒唐做法,制止约旦河西岸的犹太定居者暴力,并以联合国决议为基础,重新、包容地开始。

    [10] 卢比奥还可以通过主导与伊朗之间僵死的和平谈判、重启 6 月的谅解备忘录,为中东、全球经济、美国消费者以及他自己带来巨大好处——德黑兰坚持认为,这是走出霍尔木兹海峡僵局的唯一出路。这样做,卢比奥将获得大多数美国人、欧洲与海湾国家政府、能源生产商与企业,以及那些正确地担心特朗普把美国拖入又一场无休止战争的 MAGA 支持者的热情支持。就连特朗普也许都会感激他。他知道自己陷入了困境,他需要有人把他挖出来。

    [11] 卢比奥尽管表面上拥有独一无二的强大职位,却不太可能做上述任何一件事——这一事实使他成为美国政府中除特朗普本人之外最危险的人物。他危险,是因为他纵容并助长了特朗普最糟糕的本能,同时玩忽职守。他危险,是因为他为那些关于美国不受约束的霸权地位的极右幻想,提供了伪智识层面的体面。比起在社交媒体上幼稚地辱骂对手的冲动派万斯,以及那位咆哮的超民族主义者、「战争部长」皮特·赫格塞思,卢比奥更危险,因为他看上去、听上去都很讲道理。他很有可能成为特朗普选定的接班人、MAGA 品牌的继承人。

    [12] 也许,在这一切发生之前,他会再次改变。也许他会重新找回一些原则,长出一根外交脊梁,扑灭几场火。他已经多次表明,他的观点可以无限变换。卢比奥仍有可能做成了不起的事;也可能成为一个与特朗普一样大、甚至更大的问题。

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